Alliances

Global Context

Weltpolitik and Imperialism

With Germany unified the next step is to become a Great Power like Britain and France by joining in the scramble for Africa and the Far East for colonial expansion. 'With Germany's desire to make its influence felt outside of Europe was to bring it into conflict with the more established colonial powers, particularly Britain. This further established the emergence of more alliance systems with the naval race with Germany (Admiral Tirpitz pushed for Naval laws to expand the number of battleships)

Three Emperor's League 1873

• Loose alliance between Germany, Russia

• 1879 Dual Alliance

Graham Darby:

Keystone of German foreign policy and was renewed regularly down to 1918. Germany and Austria-Hungary promised mutual aid if either of them were attacked by Russia and benevolent neutrality in case of an attack by another power. This treaty was aimed at Russia but it was essentially defensive. It was to last five years. 

• Fischer however argues that the alliance was indeed a defensive treaty, with the inclusion of Italy in 1882 did not alter the basic fact, however, gradually transformed the Triple Alliance into the basis for German ambitions as a fledgling World Power.

• Triple Alliance 1882
• The Reinsurance treaty 1887
• Three Emperor Treaty fell due to problems at the Balkans in 1885, Separate treaty with Russia to assure that there is no risk at two fronts

1907 Triple Entente

• France-Russian Dual alliance 1892-4 - ends isolation of France created by Bismarck's policy
• Ended co-operation between Russia, Germany and Austria

Contrary to popular belief, the Triple Entente was not conceived as an offensive alliance. None of the three powers pursued expansionist aims  - Immanuel Geiss, The Origins of the First World War

Germany however were threatened by the encirclement of the Entente powers.

Rogers and Thomas, Cayses, Practices and Effects of Wars
'Bismarck worked at creating a web of alliances that wold protect Germany from future attack and would allow Germany to work on consolidating its position in Europe.' Germany main aims for these alliances were to keep France isolated and allied with Russia to prevent two front war.


Fischer

The German Weltpolitik was partly created by a domestic policy, which aimed at diverting the attention of the masses from social and political problems at home by a dynamic expansion abroad

• Anglo-Japanese Alliance 1902
• Secures the far east - able to land battleships in the Far East seas

Historiography, Interpretations and Evidence

Traditonalist/conservative view (German was to be blamed)

• Emphasis on the 'Coloured books' and Treaty of Versailles - War Guilt Clause - Article 23

 German blaming interpretations

 

Anti-revisionists – The Fischer Era 1961

 Fritz Fischer

"Germany’s Aims in the First World War”. He challenged the historical consensus and he concluded that there was a ‘will to war’ amongst the leaders of Germany (intentionalist)​

Germany had gone to War to achieve EU/Worldwide domination – bid for Wehrmact under Kaiser Wilhelm II. Similar to that aimed for by Hitler and the Nazis in 2nd WW.  There was a basic continuity in German foreign policy between 1871 and 1939.

Germany hoped that the “blank cheque” given to Austria in July 1914 would result in war. ​Germany’s leaders had deliberately accepted the risk of an escalation of a localised into a European war (intentionalist).

Germany had actually urged Austria to hit out at Serbia, and 'this policy was bound to lead to world war,' since the chances of localising the conflict were virtually non-existent - John Rohl

 

A.J.P. Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1954

[The German] bid for continental supremacy was certainly decisive in brining on the European War

John H. Maurer, The Outbreak of the First World War,1995

In the summer of 1914, Austria-Hungary and Germany began the First World War with large military offensives... While Austria-Hungary attacked in eastern Europe, Germany launched its own offensive drive against France.

German military planners counted on an offensive by Austria-Hungary to tie down Russian forces long enough for Germany to execute the Schlieffen plan.

John Rohl, Design or Delusion?, 1973

It is now known that one of Bethman Hollweg's chief preoccupations in the July crisis was to make Russia appear as the aggressor so as to persuade German nation that it must defend itself.

'The mood is brilliant,' the head of the Kaiser's Navy Cabinet could write on 1 August 1914. 'The government has succeeded very well in making us appear as the attacked'

 The Chief of General Staff, Moltke, 'wanted to launch an immediate attack.'' In his view, 'war was unavoidable, and the sooner the better.' There had, Moltke said, 'not been a more favourable opportunity since the formation of the Triple Alliance.' Admiral Tirpitz however, wanted a 'postponement of the great fight for one and a half years... until the [Kiel] Canal and the U-boat harbour on Heligoland were finished'

Tirpitz's Battle Fleet was from 1897 onwards intended not only as a lever to wrest 'world power status' for Germany from Britain, but also as the last. desperate all-or-nothing attempt to arrest the process  of democratisation at home. 

Norman Stone, World War One: A Short History, 2007

Why should not Germany acquire an overseas empire to match?

M.S. Seligmann and R.R. Mclean, Germany from Reich to Republic, 1971-1918, 2000

Germany was the only power which was actively working for a European war in 1914.

She believed the international balance of power was shifting inexorably against Germany,

This was compounded by the fear of Russia and a perception that Germany was to lose the arms race against the Entente. The July crisis was offering Germany a last chance to achieve European hegemony

Shared Guilt - revisionist/orthodox interpretations

David Stevenson, 1915 - 1918, The History of the First World War, 2012 

Only great powers can wage great wars, and six European states acknowledged each other as such: Britain, France, Russia, Austria-Hungary, Italy and Germany. Though unequal in political influence and military might, all were stronger than their neighbours. All owed their birth in part to violence and all were willing to use it.

Vladimir Lenin, Imperialism: Highest Stage of Capitalism, 1916

The war was imperialistic - annexationist, predatory and plundering - on both sides

David Lloyd George, War Memoirs, 1934

We muddled into war

Luigi Albertini, 1952

German aggressiveness during the July Crisis (and before) was the key ingredient to war 

Please note, these are just my notes as part of my revision therefore the arguments are not fully covered - please do further research into the historians, I have provided their names and books in which the quotes are published in.

Debate: Was Germany Responsible for the Outbreak of the First World War - Fischer's controversy

Please note, these are just my revision notes it may not fully cover everything. This post will briefly outline the arguments that Germany was indeed responsible, I will then post another arguing that it was a shared European guilt and further go into details.

Fritz Fischer - ultimately set the foundation for the debate

The debate on the origins of the First World War created much controversy when historian, Fritz Fisher published his thesis whereby the German government planned for the War in 1914. In Sewell words, 'Fischer believed that the truth about Germany guilt or innocence could only be determined by the official documents' these showed expansionist aims in Germany during the war. His thesis is 'associated with the idea of German responsibility for the outbreak of the war. Fisher claims that:

• Germany was prepared risk the First World War in order to gain great power and European hegemony
• Germany encouraged Austria-Hungary to start a war with Serbia
• Clear war aims that were discussed prior to the war - large territorial gains
• Planned the outbreak of the First World War from 1912 onwards

Fischer's argument was also highly criticized, some examples are that his books was accused of being 'Germanocentric' and that he neglected the policies of other powers and failed to place German policy within the context of a broader European and international developments.

Sewell further illustrated that Gerhard Ritter, a German historian stated that Fischer's work was an act of 'national disloyalty'. Ritter believed that it was unfair to blame Germany exclusively for the outbreak of war. Ritter further claims that:

• Germany acted defensively throughout the July Crisis to preserve its position in existing status quo.
• The main aim was to support their ally, Austria-Hungary.
• The German government put too much reliance on military planners who devised their war plans which were bound to lead to an escalation of the crisis.
• Germany ultimately stumbled into war by supporting Austria Hungary and by allowing military planners to 'roll the dice' and was essentially 'defensive' - you can further support this by mentioning Germany's fear of encirclement by the Entente.

Sewell: German actions in July 1914 were really a gamble which went horrendously wrong. Where Fischer saw premeditation and intent, Ritter saw blindness and miscalculation; where Fischer saw aims, Ritter saw tactics.

Fischer supporters examples

Immanuel Geiss: dominant long-term cause of the First World War was the German desire for Weltpolitik

Rohl: German government was pursuing pre-existing plans during the July crisis.

I will further go into details on the factors below in upcoming posts.

Was Germany responsible for the outbreak of the First World War:

• Flottenpolitik  - Launched in 1906 introduced a series of Navy Laws. To directly challenge British Naval supremacy. 'Their impact was to spark a naval race
• Schlieffen Plan - a plan to have wars on two fronts - to quickly finish off the French in weeks by entering through neutral Belgium then turn to focus on the Russians before they mobilize. - As General von Moltke has stated 'the sooner (for war) the better'.
• September Program 1914

Fritz Fischer further supports this side of the argument which ultimately heated up the debates in which we now refer to as the 'Fischer controversy'. As a German himself, he caused an outrage amongst the Germans and others in his findings.

• Bethman-Hollweg's aggressive foreign policy prior to 1914
• September Progra,,e
• July Crisis was an opportunity to achieve expansionist aims
• Decision makers intentionally risked a full fledged European war knowing that the Austo-Serbian war will escalate
• 'War of design'
• Domestic problems within Germany forced them to move the focus away from the inner problems and onto war
• Fischer refutes the view that Germany was innocent in the lead up to war

Wars of Illusion - Fischer placed more emphasis on the Germen domestic tensions and foreign policy.

• The German government used war as a solution to different internal problems
• War in 1914 was a leap forward - flucht nach vorn - to establish German hegemony and domestic peace.
• The whole decision making elite had to take responsibility for war - intentionalist

Flaws in Fischer's argument

• Evidence Fischer used

Diaries of Admiral Muller (published in 1965) in which there was a reference to a meeting on 8th Dec 1912 of the Kaiser and top military advisors

•  Fischer states that this was the War Council Dec 1912 - this meeting provides evidence that the path to war had already been decided and postponed according to Germany's need for preparation.

Emphasis on the War Council

• Bethmann was not present at this meeting and did not endorse its conclusions (Stachan)
• Policy followed by Germany (Dec 1912 - July 1914) is not marked by the consistency which would endorse Fischer's argument.
• Muller's own conclusion was that this meeting amount to 'almost 0'
• It was a reaction and response to Britain's declaration that they would support France unconditionally in the event of a war.

Fischer links Germany's Welpolitik, Flottenpolitik, the belligerence of its pre-war diplomacy and conduct in July Crisis together in a coherent and plausible manner. It was more convincing that the interpretation that suggests Europe stumbled into a war in 1914. However, his interpretation of the War Council (1912) did not ultimately in fact make a decision to go to war - some historians argue that this was merely a defensive meeting if Germany was to go to war. The September programme was written after the war had begun therefore cannot be taken as evidence of prewar intents. There is also no solid evidence that showed Germany's leaders were influenced by the inner domestic policies.